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ABSTRACT (added 5-5-14) 
This paper argues in unprecedented empirical and philosophical detail that, given 
only what science has discovered about pain, we should prefer the materialist 
hypothesis that pains are purely material over the dualist hypothesis that they are 
immaterial.  The empirical findings cited provide strong evidence for the thesis of 
empirical supervenience: that to every sort of introspectible change over time in 
pains, or variation among pains at a time, there corresponds in fact a certain sort of 
simultaneous neural change over time, or variation at a time.  The empirical 
supervenience of pain on the neural is shown in turn to favor the hypothesis that 





 Philosophical discussions of the mind-body problem have often taken pain as 
their leading example of a phenomenally conscious mental state (see, e.g., Kripke 
1980).  In this paper,  I discuss the implications for the mind-body problem of what 




 Science has clearly taught us much about the etiology of pain.  It has taught us 
that there are several different types of specialized nociceptive neurons, distinct 
from tactile sensors and proprioceptors, that are sensitive to noxious stimuli of 
different kinds, e.g., to thermal, mechanical, or chemical stimuli (Price 1999, 76-79).  
It has taught us that bundles of these neurons run first to the spine, where they 
synapse with neurons that then run, along several distinct pathways, to various 
regions of the brain, some of which project further neurons to the cortex (Price 
1999, 98-107).  It has taught us that the presentation of a noxious stimulus reliably 
activates various distinct cortical areas—primary somatosensory cortex, secondary 
somatosensory cortex and its vicinity in the parietal operculum, insular cortex, 
anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex (see, e.g., McMahon and 
Koltzenburg, 128). 
 
 Less clear but still—I claim—true is that the science of pain bears on the 
nature of pain, i.e., on the question whether pain sensations are—in some sense that 
needs to be made precise—immaterial rather than purely material states.  My main 
conclusion in this paper is that what science has discovered about pain favors the 
hypothesis that pains are purely material over the rival hypothesis that they are 
immaterial; that is, given only the evidence that science has discovered, we should 
prefer the materialist hypothesis over the dualist (i.e., immaterialist) one.1 
 
 
1 I do not argue against idealism in this paper, though it is, of course, an alternative to 
both materialism and dualism. 
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 This conclusion is a modest one.  It is consistent with the claim that, given all 
relevant rational considerations, we should not prefer the materialist hypothesis 
over the dualist one.  For it may be that what science has discovered about pain does 
not exhaust the relevant rational considerations.  It may be, as many philosophers 
think, that materialism can be refuted a priori, or by appeal to what is conceivable, 
or by appeal to what introspection tells us about the nature of pain.  And it may be 
that such non-scientific considerations support dualism about pain strongly enough 
to outweigh the evidence against it provided by scientific discoveries.  I strongly 
doubt that in fact they do, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why.2   
 
 Does anyone actually deny that what science has discovered about pain 
favors the materialist hypothesis about pains over the dualist one?  Some dualists 
may deny it.  At any rate, I do not recall ever having read a dualist acknowledge that 
science at least makes it appear that pain is purely material; and some dualists 
resort rather readily to sociological explanation of the popularity of materialism 
among philosophers and scientists, as if the existence of apparent evidence for 
materialism could not explain it.  Some pain scientists do not deny but still hesitate 
to affirm the main conclusion of this paper.  For they characterize the relationship 
between pains and neural states in strikingly imprecise and non-committal terms, as 
if reluctant to assert definite materialist theses.  Consider, for a representative 
example, a recent journal article that speaks of “brain areas involved in pain 
processing”, and “the neural basis of pain processing” (Schweinhardt and Bushnell 
 
2 Criticism of arguments for dualism may be found in (Hill 1991, 19-43; Hill 2009, 100-
127; Papineau 2002, 47-95; and Melnyk 2001). 
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2010, 3788; italics added); the article makes no attempt to sharpen the meanings of  
the italicized expressions.  The main conclusion of this paper will presumably meet 
no resistance from materialist philosophers, but the way I reach it is controversial.  
The materialist philosophers Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have argued for 
a conclusion similar to mine about sensations of all kinds (Hill 1991; McLaughlin 
2010).  But the way in which scientific findings favor materialism over dualism is 
not the same on their account as on mine—and my way has a few advantages, as we 
shall see. 
 
 It will throw the key issue raised by this paper into sharp relief to consider at 
length the epistemic position of Aliens.  Aliens are non-human cognitive 
neuroscientists who want to know what sensations of (human) pain are, and who 
have access to everything that (human) science has discovered about pain, as well 
as to the testimony of pain-feeling humans who report on their own pains and what 
they are like.  What distinguishes Aliens from human scientists is that they are so 
different from humans physiologically and phylogenetically (let’s say they evolved 
from a distinct origin of life) that they hold—rightly—that nothing they know about 
their own mental lives through introspection (assuming they know anything at all 
about their own mental lives through introspection) has any evidential bearing on 
the nature of the internal states that the English-speaking objects of their inquiry 
call “pains”.  Consequently, anything that Aliens come to think about what (human) 
pain sensations are must be evidenced solely by what (human) science has 
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discovered about pain, including what humans report about the occurrence and 
nature of their own pains.  
 
 Give these restrictions, what should Aliens conclude about the nature of 
human pains?  Perhaps nothing; perhaps the science of pain has merely discovered 
information about the causal chain that typically begins with a noxious stimulus and 
ends with a sensation of pain, while leaving it open what the final link in this 
chain—pain—actually is, e.g., whether it is a neural state of some kind or some sort 
of immaterial state.  I claim, however, that Aliens should conclude that pains are 
purely material (in a sense to be explained) rather than immaterial.  First I argue 
that the science of pain has discovered evidence favoring the hypothesis that pains 
are purely material over the rival hypothesis that they are immaterial.  Then I argue 
that the science of pain has discovered no evidence favoring the dualist hypothesis 
over the materialist hypothesis.  Hence the totality of evidence available to Aliens 
favors the materialist hypothesis.  The first argument occupies section III and most 
of section IV; the second occupies the balance of section IV.  Section V infers from 
the conclusion about Aliens some morals about human inquirers.  Section II is 





 We need to be more precise about what materialism and dualism amount to.3  
For present purposes, materialism is best understood as the view that every mental 
state that a human can be in is purely material in the sense that it meets one of the 
following two conditions: 
 
(1) it is identical with—one and the same thing  as—some or other 
uncontroversially material state that a human can be in (e.g., a neural state); 
 
(2) it is identical with—one and the same thing  as—some or other higher-
order state that a human can be in, and every actual case of a particular 
human’s being in that higher-order state is realized by the human’s being in 
some or other uncontroversially material state (e.g., a neural state).4 
 
The expressions “higher-order” and “realized” that appear in (2) are philosophical 
terms of art.  I understand them as follows.  A higher-order state of a thing is a 
special sort of state that a thing can be in—a state such that the thing’s being in that 
state just is the thing’s being in any (lower-order) state that meets a certain 
condition, e.g., that plays a particular causal or functional role in relation to other 
 
3 Most of what I say in this section about the formulation of materialism and dualism is a 
simplified version of the position I defend at length elsewhere (Melnyk 2003, 1-70).  The position 
is, of course, controversial. 
4 In claiming that a mental state is purely material if and only if it meets one of these two 
conditions, I set the bar for pain’s being purely material higher than do Kenneth Sufka and 
Michael Lynch, who claim that pain is purely material if it “naturally supervenes on a distinct 
neural subsystem” (Sufka and Lynch 2000, 311). 
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(lower-order) states.5  And a thing’s being in a particular higher-order state is 
realized by the thing’s being in a particular (lower-order) state iff the (lower-order) 
state is one of those that meet the relevant condition for the higher-order state in 
question.  If there is more than one (lower-order) state that can meet the relevant 
condition, the higher-order state in question is said to be multiply realizable. 
 
 Why is meeting condition (2) logically sufficient for materialism?  If a thing 
happens to be in one of the (lower-order) material states that meet the relevant 
condition for a certain higher-order state, then the thing absolutely must be in that 
higher-order state.6  And if the high-order state is identical with—one and the same 
thing as—a certain mental state, then the thing absolutely must be in that mental 
state.  It follows that, if the thing is in the (lower-order) material state in question, it 
absolutely must be in the mental state in question—which is a way of saying that 
there is no more to the thing’s being in the mental state (on this occasion) than its 
being in that (lower-order) material state.  Or, more colorfully, if God put you into 
the material state, he wouldn’t need to do anything else to bring it about that you 
were in the mental state. 
 
 
5 Two notes on terminology.  (1) What I here call a “higher-order” state is usually called 
a “functional” state in the philosophical literature.  (2) In this section, when I speak of a “mental 
state”, I mean something that multiple persons, or a single person at multiple times, can be in, i.e., 
what the literature calls a “mental state-type”.  But there is also a usage of “mental states” in 
which a person’s mental states are not the states (i.e., state-types) that she is in, but rather those 
particular states of affairs each of which consists of her being in some or other mental state (i.e., 
state-type); such particular states of affairs are called “mental state-tokens” in the literature. 
6 Given the actual laws of nature.  I shall take this qualification as read from now on. 
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 A simple illustration of these very abstract ideas is provided by the state 
(that a gun can be in) of being loaded.  A gun’s being loaded is plausibly regarded as 
a higher-order state of the gun, specifically, as being one and the same as the gun’s 
being in some or other state such that, if the gun’s trigger is pulled, the gun rapidly 
emits a projectile.  A particular gun’s being loaded on a particular occasion is 
realized by its having a certain complex constitution and construction.  But because 
different guns are made of different materials, and constructed on different 
principles, being loaded is a multiply realizable higher-order state.  In consequence, 
being loaded is not identical with—one and the same thing as—any kind of (first-
order) material state.  But materialism about guns is still true, because every 
particular gun’s being loaded is in fact realized by some particular material state of 
the gun. 
 
 In exactly the same way, pain is purely material if it turns out to be identical 
with a specific neural state, e.g., with the state of undergoing such-and-such activity 
in so-and-so parts of the pain-feeler’s primary somatosensory cortex.  But it’s also 
purely material if, even though it isn’t identical with a particular neural state, it 
turns out to be one and the same as a specific higher-order state, and every pain-
feeler’s being in that higher-order state turns out to be realized by the pain-feeler’s 
being in some or other material state.  The material state might be a human neural 
state, or a neural state but one that’s different from any human neural state that 
realizes pain, or an electronic state of some microprocessor in a pain-feeling robot, 
or something else again.  What might the higher-order state be?  A natural—though 
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imprecise—hypothesis would be this: to be an organism that is in pain = to be a 
system containing a subsystem which (i) has the function of detecting imminent or 
actual damage to the system and of getting the system to respond appropriately, 
where appropriate response includes preventing the damage from occurring or 
making it stop and letting the system recover, and which (ii) is activated in such-
and-such ways.  But I only mention this hypothesis for the sake of giving a relatively 
concrete illustration.7 
 
 Two final points about the formulation of materialism.  First, there is a 
difference between (i) saying that every mental state is identical with some or other 
material state, or materially-realized higher-order state, and (ii) actually specifying, 
for each mental state, which material state, or materially-realized higher-order state, 
that mental state is.  The formulation of materialism given above does the former, 
but it does not aspire to do the latter.  The second point is epistemological.  That a 
certain mental state turns out to be identical with a certain material state, or 
materially-realizable higher-order state, is not something that we should expect to 
be discoverable by any a priori means, e.g., by reflecting on the meanings of the 
words (concepts) we use to talk about (think about) mental states.  Rather, such 
identity claims must be discovered empirically, as was the identity of water with 
H2O or of genes with segments of the DNA molecule: hypotheses that this kind of 
thing is one and the same as that kind of thing must be proposed and then tested 
against the evidence.  A corollary is that materialism itself—which asserts the 
 
7 Colin Klein has proposed an interestingly detailed and more plausible hypothesis (Klein 
2007). 
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holding of an identity claim for every mental state—has the status of an empirical 
hypothesis, albeit one of great generality.  It is analogous to the uncontroversially 
scientific hypothesis that every kind of atom is identical with some or other kind of 
microphysical structure composed of protons, electrons, and (in nearly all cases) 
neutrons. 
 
 Dualism can now be formulated as the view that every mental state—or 
perhaps every mental state of a certain sort—is immaterial in the sense that it meets 
neither of the two conditions above: it is neither identical (1) with any 
uncontroversially material state nor (2) with any higher-order state every particular 




 The science of pain has discovered certain remarkable correspondences 
between (i) changes in pains over time (or variation among pains at a time), as 
revealed by the introspective reports of experimental subjects, and (ii) changes over 
time (or variations at a time) in the subjects’ simultaneous neural states, as revealed 
by various imaging techniques.  In this section, I describe five such correspondences 
in some detail and then argue that they support quite a strong claim to the effect 
that pain depends on the neural.  Part of the reason for going into detail is to show 
that the evidence I allege for materialism results from genuine empirical discovery, 
and not just the influence of materialist presuppositions; part is to show, by means 
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of extensive quotation, that I am not interpreting the science tendentiously; and part 
is to show how surprisingly fine-grained the neural dependence of pain is. 
 
 First, however, a brief preliminary.  Pain researchers Price, Barrell, and 
Rainville (2002) report that 
 
Psychophysical observers [i.e., the subjects in pain experiments] can be 
trained to detect very small differences in sensory qualities and intensities 
and to differentially judge magnitudes of different dimensions or qualities of 
their experience... (600) 
 
One such difference that observers can be trained to detect is—perhaps 
surprisingly—between the intensity and the unpleasantness of the pains they are 
undergoing.  Anecdotal evidence for this distinction is the case of a man, reported by 
Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler (1999), who had a cortical lesion that altered his 
capacity to feel pain in the left hand when it was subjected to noxious thermal 
stimuli: 
 
For left hand, up to an intensity of 600 mJ, no pain sensation could be elicited.  
However, at intensities of 350 mJ and more, the patient spontaneously 
described a ‘clearly unpleasant’ intensity dependent feeling emerging from 
an ill-localized and extended area ‘somewhere between fingertips and 
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shoulder’, that he wanted to avoid.  The fully cooperative and eloquent 
patient was completely unable to further describe quality, localization and 
intensity of the perceived stimulus.  Suggestions from a given word list 
containing ‘warm’, ‘hot’, ‘cold’, ‘touch’, ‘burning’, ‘pinprick-like’, ‘slight pain’, 
‘moderate pain’ and ‘intense pain’ were denied… . (213)  
 
The subject of the experiment is apparently reporting a sensation with some of the 
affective features of pain but without its usual sensory features.  More systematic 
evidence is provided by two studies, Rainville et al. (1997) and Hofbauer et al. 
(2001), in which hypnotic suggestion was used to alter the reported unpleasantness 
of experimental subjects’ pains without at the same time altering the pains’ reported 
intensity—and conversely to alter the reported intensity of the pains without at the 
same time altering their reported unpleasantness. 
 
 Now for the first correspondence.  Bushnell et al. (1999) report finding “that 
[somatosensory cortex region] S1 activation is modulated by cognitive 
manipulations that alter perceived pain intensity” (7709).  Similarly, Hofbauer et al. 
(2001) report that 
 
[a]s shown in previous brain imaging studies, noxious thermal stimuli 
presented during the alert and hypnosis-control conditions reliably activated 
contralateral structures, including primary somatosensory cortex (S1), 
secondary somatosensory cortex (S2), anterior cingulate cortex, and insular 
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cortex.  Hypnotic modulation of the intensity of the pain sensation led to 
significant changes in pain-evoked activity within S1… . (402; my emphasis) 
 
Corresponding to differences in the felt intensity of different pains, then, are 
differences in the simultaneous level of pain-evoked activity in S1. 
 
 A second correspondence concerns change in the felt intensity of a single 
pain over time.  Porro et al. (1998) provide the following abstract of their study of 
“the time course of perceived pain intensity and the activity of discrete cortical 
populations during noxious somatic stimulation lasting several minutes” (3316): 
 
We used a high-resolution functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
technique in healthy right-handed volunteers to demonstrate cortical areas 
displaying changes of activity significantly related to the time profile of the 
perceived intensity of experimental somatic pain over the course of several 
minutes.  Twenty-four subjects (ascorbic acid group) received a 
subcutaneous injection of a dilute ascorbic acid solution into the dorsum of 
one foot, inducing prolonged burning pain (peak pain intensity on a 0–100 
scale: 48 ± 3, mean ± SE; duration: 11.9 ± 0.8 min).  fMRI data sets were 
continuously acquired for ~20 min, beginning 5 min before and lasting 15 
min after the onset of stimulation, from two sagittal planes on the medial  
hemispheric wall contralateral to the stimulated site, including the cingulate 
cortex and the putative foot representation area of the primary 
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somatosensory cortex (SI).  Neural clusters whose fMRI signal time courses 
were positively or negatively correlated (P < 0.0005) with the individual pain 
intensity curve were identified by cross-correlation statistics in all 24 
volunteers.  The spatial extent of the identified clusters was linearly related (P < 
0.0001) to peak pain intensity.  Regional analyses showed that positively 
correlated clusters were present in the majority of subjects in SI, cingulate, 
motor, and premotor cortex. Negative correlations were found 
predominantly in medial parietal, perigenual cingulate, and medial prefrontal 
regions. To test whether these neural changes were due to aspecific arousal 
or emotional reactions, related either to anticipation or presence of pain, 
fMRI experiments were performed with the same protocol in two additional 
groups of volunteers, subjected either to subcutaneous saline injection 
(saline: n = 16) , inducing mild short-lasting pain (peak pain intensity 23 ± 4; 
duration 2.8 ±  0.6 min) or to nonnoxious mechanical stimulation of the skin 
(controls: n = 16) at the same body site.  Subjects did not know in advance 
which stimulus would occur.  The spatial extent of neural clusters whose 
signal time courses were positively or negatively correlated with the mean 
pain intensity curve of subjects injected with ascorbic acid was significantly 
larger (P < 0.001) in the ascorbic acid group than both saline and controls, 
suggesting that the observed responses were specifically related to pain 
intensity and duration.  These findings reveal distributed cortical systems, 
including parietal areas as well as cingulate and frontal regions, involved in 
dynamic encoding of pain intensity over time, a process of great biological 
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and clinical relevance. (3312; my emphasis) 
 
Corresponding to changes in the felt intensity over time of a single pain, then, are 
simultaneous changes in the intensity of neural activity in certain regions (S1, 
cingulate, motor, and premotor cortex) of a pain-feeler’s brain. 
 
 A third correspondence concerns the introspectible difference between the 
intensity and the unpleasantness of a single pain at a given time.  As we saw, in two 
studies hypnotic suggestion was used to alter the reported unpleasantness of 
experimental subjects’ pains without at the same time altering their reported 
intensity—and vice versa.  Even more fascinating is what was revealed by these 
studies to happen in the subjects’ brains as the reported unpleasantness and the 
reported intensity of their pains were modified independently of one another 
(Rainville et al. 1997; Hofbauer et al. 2001).  In the first study, changes in the 
reported unpleasantness of pain (with no change in the reported intensity of pain) 
were correlated with changes in the level of activation in the anterior cingulate 
cortex, though there was no change in the level of activation in S1.  In the second 
study, changes in the reported intensity of pain (with no change in the reported 
unpleasantness of pain) were correlated with changes in the level of activation in S1, 
though there was no change in the level of activation in the anterior cingulate cortex 
activation.  As Hofbauer et al. put it, 
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This double dissociation of cortical modulation indicates a relative 
specialization of the sensory and the classical limbic cortical areas in the 
processing of the sensory and affective dimensions of pain. (402) 
 
So, corresponding to changes in the introspectible sensory and affective dimensions 
of a single pain are, respectively, simultaneous changes in neural activity in two 
distinct regions of the brain, with changes in the affective dimension of a pain 
apparently varying with levels of activation in “the classical limbic cortical areas”. 
 
 A fourth correspondence concerns the phenomenon known as first pain and 
second pain, which can be characterized as follows (Ploner et al. 2002): 
 
… single painful stimuli yield two successive and qualitatively distinct 
sensations referred to as first and second pain sensation [citation omitted]. 
First pain is brief, pricking, and well localized, whereas second pain is longer-
lasting, burning, and less well localized. (12444) 
 
A single painful stimulus yields two successive sensations because of the different 
arrival times of impulses from two different kinds of nociceptive nerve fibers—Aδ 
fibers and C fibers—which differ in their myelination and hence conductance.  But 




We…used magnetoencephalography to record and directly compare first and 
second pain-related cortical responses to cutaneous laser stimuli in humans.  
[…]  Cortical activity was located in primary (S1) and secondary (S2) 
somatosensory cortices and anterior cingulate cortex.  Time courses of 
activations disclosed that first pain was particularly related to activation of S1 
whereas second pain was closely related to anterior cingulate cortex activation. 
Both sensations were associated with S2 activation. (12444; my emphasis) 
 
In the early time window, the time courses of activations show significant 
activation of S1, bilateral S2, and ACC reflecting Aδ fiber-mediated and first 
pain-related activation of these areas. In the late time window bilateral S2 
and ACC show strong activations, whereas no significant activation is seen in 
S1 indicating C fiber-mediated and second pain-related activation of bilateral 
S2 and ACC but not of S1. (12446) 
 
Corresponding to the introspectible differences between first pain and second pain, 
then, is a difference in the locations of simultaneous cortical activity. 
 
 A fifth correspondence concerns the felt locations that pains typically have.  
Various studies (e.g., Andersson et al. 1997; Bingel et al. 2004) have shown that S1 
exhibits somatotopic organization: roughly, neighboring neurons in S1 can be traced 
back, via synaptic connections, to neighboring nociceptive neurons in the body.  But 
although these studies aimed to reveal a correspondence between the actual 
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locations of noxious stimuli and activity in specific regions of S1, rather than 
between the felt locations of the pains caused by the stimuli and activity in specific 
regions of S1, they nonetheless support the existence of the latter correspondence.  
For in both studies the subjects did in fact report on their pains, and had the felt 
locations they reported not coincided with the actual locations of the noxious 
stimuli, the researchers would surely have noted the fact, which they did not do.  I 
conclude that corresponding to the different felt locations of pains is simultaneous 
neural activity in different regions of S1. 
 
 Each of these five correspondences is an instance in which corresponding to 
a certain sort of introspectible change over time in pains, or variation among pains 
at a time, there is a certain sort of simultaneous neural change over time, or neural 
variation at a time.  Moreover, despite extensive studies of the kinds cited above, no 
sort of introspectible change over time in pains, or variation among pains at a time, 
has been discovered to which there fails to correspond some sort of simultaneous 
change in, or variation among, neural states, even though discovering such failures 
of correspondence is readily conceivable and lies within our current observational 
abilities.  But observed positive instances of a universal generalization (with no 
observed negative instances) provide inductive evidence that the universal 
generalization is true.8  Therefore, the five correspondences noted above provide 
inductive evidence for the conclusion that to every sort of introspectible change over 
 
8 This inductive principle fails in certain well-known pathological cases that give rise to 
paradoxes of confirmation such as Nelson Goodman’s “grue” paradox and Hempel’s paradox of 
the ravens.  But there is no reason to think that the present case is pathological. 
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time in pains, or variation among pains at a time, there corresponds a certain sort of 
simultaneous neural change over time, or variation at a time.  Let us call this 
conclusion the empirical supervenience claim, since it says that in fact no sort of 
introspectible change or variation in pains occurs without a certain sort of 
simultaneous change or variation in neural state. 
 
 The empirical supervenience claim belongs to a family of empirical claims to 
the effect that the mental depends on the neural.  It is worth comparing the strength 
of the empirical supervenience claim with that of other members of the family.  It is 
obviously much stronger than the claim that, if one is ever in pain, then one has a 
properly functioning brain, for the same is true of a properly functioning circulatory 
system.  It is stronger too than the claim that, if one is in pain (no matter of what 
sort), then one is in so-and-so neural state, for the latter claim leaves open the 
possibility that pains with different introspectible characters do not require being in 
different kinds of neural state.  The empirical supervenience claim excludes this 
possibility, since it says that change or variation in the introspectible character of 
pain never occurs without a certain sort of neural change or variation. 
 
 On the other hand, the empirical supervenience claim is weaker than at least 
one of its kin.  Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin’s argument for materialism 
about sensations rests on a certain empirical claim that they call the “correlation 
thesis” (Hill 1991; McLaughlin 2010).  McLaughlin formulates the thesis as follows: 
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For any type of state of phenomenal consciousness C there is a type of 
physical state P such that it is true and counterfactual supporting that a being 
is in C if and only if the being is in P (McLaughlin 2010, 267) 
 
Even if the scope of the correlation thesis is limited to conscious states involved in 
pain, it goes well beyond what the empirical supervenience claim affirms, since it 
claims that for each such state there is a physical state that is not just necessary but 
also sufficient for the conscious state.  The empirical supervenience claim affirms 
only that a certain sort of simultaneous neural change (or variation) is necessary for 
each sort of change (or variation) in pain.  A corollary of this difference in logical 
strength is that it is much easier to come up with evidence for the empirical 
supervenience claim than for the Hill-McLaughlin correlation thesis.  Indeed, 
evidencing the correlation thesis would seem to require discovering the so-called 
“neural correlates” of at least some conscious mental states.  That doing so has 
proved to be problematic is presumably why neither Hill nor McLaughlin actually 
asserts the correlation thesis; they present their argument for materialism as 




 What, then, is the evidential significance for Aliens of the empirical 
supervenience claim?  The first point to note is that materialism—as formulated in 
section II—is consistent with and indeed predicts the empirical supervenience 
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claim.  It is worth spelling out why.  If materialism is true, then there are just two 
sensible possibilities regarding pain: 
 
(1) Pain is one and the same as a certain complex neural state.  The different 
kinds of pain (e.g., pain in the right foot, intensely unpleasant pain in the 
right foot, intensely unpleasant pain in the right foot of duration 18 seconds) 
are one and the same as certain more specific neural states.  
 
(2) Pain is one and the same as a certain higher-order state, such that every 
particular pain-feeler’s being in that higher-order state is realized by the 
pain-feeler’s being in some or other neural state.  The different kinds of pain 
are one and the same as certain more specific kinds of higher-order state, 
such that every particular pain-feeler’s being in a higher-order state of any of 
these more specific kinds is realized by the pain-feeler’s being in some or 
other more specific neural state. 
 
Suppose that the first possibility is actual, and that kinds of pain just are kinds of 
neural state.  Then obviously there must be a certain sort of neural change or 
variation corresponding to, and simultaneous with, each sort of change over time in 
pains (or variation at a time among pains).  Nothing at all can possibly change or 
vary without itself changing or varying. 
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 Suppose now that the second possibility is actual.  The empirical 
supervenience claim must be true in this case too, though seeing why is harder.  
Consider Jan, whom we may safely assume to be a biologically normal human whose 
extra-cranial neuronal wiring doesn’t spontaneously change in any significant way 
over the short term; the data we’re trying to accommodate concern precisely such 
humans.9  Suppose that Jan is in pain of kind P at time t, and her being in pain of kind 
P at t is realized by her being in complex neural state N at t.  By the definition of 
“realized” in section II, P must be identical with a certain higher-order state H, and N 
must meet the relevant condition for H; that is, N must meet condition C, where to 
be in H = to be in one of the states that meet C.  Since Jan is in N, and since N meets C, 
Jan must be in H.  Further, since H = P, she must be in P.  So, since Jan is in N, she 
must be in P.  But now imagine that Jan ceases to be in P; perhaps she enters a pain 
state of a different kind, or perhaps she stops being in pain of any kind.  How can 
this happen?  The physico-chemical laws governing neural states cannot change, and 
H cannot cease to be identical with P, since that would require that H cease to be 
identical with itself.  So the only way in which Jan can cease to be in P is for her to 
undergo a change of neural state, i.e., to cease to be in N.  The upshot, then, is that, if 
Jan ceases to be in P, then she undergoes some simultaneous change of neural state.  
And this upshot may be generalized: given possibility (2), every sort of 
introspectible diachronic change in pains is accompanied by a certain sort of 
simultaneous diachronic neural change.  Finally, analogous reasoning shows that 
 
9 The assumption means that we can disregard the possibility that Jan’s state of pain can 
change simply because of a change in circumstances external to her brain; such a possibility 
exists if pain turns out to be an essentially representational state whose content is determined in 
part by circumstances external to the subject’s brain. 
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possibility (2) also entails that the other half of the empirical supervenience claim is 
true, i.e., that every sort of introspectible variation among pains at a time is 
accompanied by a certain sort of simultaneous neural variation.  The key point is 
that, if Jen’s twin brother, Jon, were also in N, then he would have to be in P too; so if 
he is not also in P, he cannot be in N. 
 
 What about dualism?  Consider, first, a version of dualism that regards pain 
as a state of the immaterial mind, that treats the immaterial mind as receiving 
sensory input from the brain and emitting motor instructions for the brain to 
execute, but that treats the brain as unnecessary for mentality except insofar as it is 
needed to send sensory input to the mind and to execute the mind’s motor 
instructions.  On this version of dualism, sensory states, including pain, can change 
without there being any corresponding simultaneous neural changes.  Such a view is 
falsified by the empirical supervenience claim. 
 
 But there are, of course, dualist views which allow and indeed predict the 
empirical supervenience claim.  One such dualist view regards pain as a state of the 
immaterial mind, but a state that the mind is caused to enter by a certain 
simultaneous neural state of the subject.  Another such dualist view treats pain as an 
immaterial state that the subject’s brain is caused to enter by a certain simultaneous 
neural state; it therefore assumes that the brain can instantiate immaterial 
properties.10  A third and a fourth dualist view can be formed by replacing the 
 
10 It seems to be David Chalmers’ positive view (Chalmers 1996). 
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appeal to simultaneous neural-to-mental causation in the two preceding views with 
an appeal to non-causal neural-to-mental laws of association. 
 
 Since there are versions of dualism that, like materialism, entail and are 
consistent with the empirical supervenience claim, it is tempting to conclude that 
the empirical supervenience claim cannot possibly favor materialism over the 
relevant versions of dualism.  And this conclusion is correct if a naïve Popperian 
falsificationism is true according to which the only regulative role for evidence is to 
contradict hypotheses; for the empirical supervenience claim does not contradict 
the relevant versions of dualism.  Indeed,  I conjecture that the widespread 
endorsement of naïve Popperian falsificationism by scientists is what explains why, 
as noted in section I, pain scientists are reluctant to treat their findings as favoring 
materialism over dualism.11  The conclusion that the empirical supervenience claim 
cannot possibly favor materialism over the relevant versions of dualism is also 
correct if an extreme form of empiricism is true according to which the empirical 
accuracy of competing hypotheses is the only feature relevant to their relative 
evidential status; for materialism and the relevant versions of dualism are equally 
accurate empirically.  And I conjecture that the possibly tacit assumption of this 
form of empiricism is what explains why, as noted in section I, few dualists seem 




11 One need only read the first chapter of half a dozen college textbooks to see the 
pervasive influence of naïve Popperian falsificationism in science. 
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 But naïve Popperian falsificationism and the extreme form of empiricism in 
question are both open to serious objections (Newton-Smith 1981, Ch. 3; Laudan 
1995).  One especially important objection is that both views lead to an 
unacceptable skepticism.  The crux is that, for pretty much any hypothesis that we 
presently favor, and any evidence that the hypothesis entails and is consistent with, 
we can concoct a rival hypothesis that entails and is consistent with the very same 
evidence.  So, for example, the hypothesis that the universe is only ten minutes old 
can be formulated to be consistent with all the evidence usually taken to support the 
conventional view; likewise, of course, for creationism.  And if either naïve 
Popperian falsificationism or the extreme form of empiricism in question is true, it 
follows that we have no evidential grounds for preferring the original hypothesis 
over the concocted one.  For, by assumption, the concocted hypothesis is not 
contradicted by any of the evidence, and it is just as accurate empirically as the 
original hypothesis. 
 
 To avoid such skepticism, we need to allow that factors other than empirical 
accuracy can be relevant to the comparative evidential merits of competing 
hypotheses, such factors as parsimony and fit with background knowledge (these 
factors are often called “super-empirical criteria”).  We can do so in a way adequate 
for present purposes by adopting the following principle of evidence: 
 
Evidence E favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 if  
 each of H1 and H2 entails and is consistent with E; 
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 H1 fares better than H2 on at least one super-empirical criterion; 
and 
 H2 does not fare better than H1 on any super-empirical criterion. 
 
This principle plausibly implies that the standard evidence favors the conventional 
view of the age of the universe over the ten-minute hypothesis, since the latter is so 
spectacularly unparsimonious, and fits so poorly with background knowledge, in 
comparison with the former.  The principle could be embedded in different overall 
accounts of evidence and theory-choice, e.g., in a Bayesian account in which the 
initial prior probability of a hypothesis is assessed by reference to super-empirical 
criteria, or in Philip Kitcher’s eliminativist account in which that hypothesis is 
preferred which is consistent with all the evidence and which achieves this 
consistency at the lowest cost in terms of the super-empirical criteria (Kitcher 1993, 
237ff.). 
 
 I will, of course, use the principle to argue that the empirical supervenience 
claim favors materialism about pains over the relevant versions of dualism about 
pains.  Arguing in this way enables me to sidestep an objection that Jaegwon Kim 
has made to the Hill-McLaughlin argument for materialism about sensations (Kim 
2005, Ch. 5).  The Hill-McLaughlin argument uses the principle of inference to the 
best explanation, whereby the explanatory power of a hypothesis counts in favor of 
its truth: they argue that their correlation thesis (see above) is better explained on 
the hypothesis that sensations are purely material than on any rival hypothesis 
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saying that they are immaterial.  Kim’s objection is that the materialist hypothesis is 
an identity claim (which, as we saw in section II, it is), and that identity claims never 
have genuine explanatory power.  Using the principle above, however, I need not 
assume that identity claims have explanatory power.  
 
 Here is why the empirical supervenience claim favors materialism about 
pains over the relevant versions of dualism about pains.  Both materialism and the 
relevant versions of dualism entail and are logically consistent with the empirical 
supervenience claim, as we have seen.  But materialism fares better than the 
relevant versions of dualism on the super-empirical criteria of (i) parsimony and (ii) 
fit with background knowledge,12 while the relevant versions of dualism do not fare 
better than materialism on any such criterion.  With regard to parsimony, it’s true 
that both materialism and these versions of dualism are committed to the neural 
states corresponding to the various kinds of pain and to the various kinds of pain 
themselves; but what this commitment comes to is not the same in each case.  
According to any dualist view, even after God has created Jen in neural state N, and 
instituted the right physico-chemical laws, he has to do further work to put Jen into 
the state of pain P to which N corresponds; P is no ontological free lunch.  According 
to materialism, however, once God has created Jen in neural state N and instituted 
the right physico-chemical laws, he has nothing further to do, for whether it turns 
out that P = N or that P = H, if Jen is in N and the physico-chemical laws hold, she 
 
12 And perhaps also on the criterion of explanatory power.  The versions of dualism in 
question certainly entail the empirical supervenience claim, but to entail something is not 
necessarily to explain it.  Perhaps an empirical generalization is not explained, or explained only 
poorly, by saying merely that it holds as a matter of law. 
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must be in P.  So the versions of dualism in question are less parsimonious than 
materialism, because they treat mental states as fundamental, non-neural states, 
rather than as real states that are, however, nothing over and above neural states. 
 
 The versions of dualism in question are less parsimonious than materialism 
in a second way too.  As we have just seen, materialism can reductively explain the 
empirical supervenience thesis without taking it to reflect the holding of a myriad of 
irreducible neural-to-mental laws over and above the standard physico-chemical 
laws that ultimately govern neural states.  However, the versions of dualism in 
question take mental states to be immaterial states, and so, since no physico-
chemical laws govern immaterial states, they cannot reductively explain the 
empirical supervenience thesis, and therefore must take it to reflect the holding of a 
myriad of irreducible neural-to-mental laws.  Like materialism, therefore, the 
versions of dualism in question are committed to the holding of the standard 
physico-chemical laws that ultimately govern neural states; but, unlike materialism, 
they are also committed to the myriad of irreducible neural-to-mental laws.  That is 
what makes them less parsimonious than materialism. 
 
 Turning to fit with background knowledge (of Aliens), consider the thesis 
that all states other than mental states are ultimately realized by physical states, i.e., 
states describable in the proprietary vocabulary of physics.13  Such a claim is a 
commonplace among scientists, and in fact accepted by nearly all contemporary 
 
13 To mental states should be added any sociological states partially constituted by mental 
states. 
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dualists—unsurprisingly, in light of the strong evidence for it. 14  Now materialism 
about the mind coheres well with this thesis, since, if mental states are identical 
with, or realized by, neural states, then mental states turn out to be just like all other 
kinds of state in being ultimately realized by physical states.  By contrast, however, 
all forms of dualism cohere poorly with the thesis, since, if mental states were 
immaterial, then they could not turn out to be ultimately realized by physical states; 
mental states would be the sole exceptions to an otherwise exceptionless 
generalization. 
 
 Let us now ask whether the relevant versions of dualism fare better than 
materialism on any of the super-empirical criteria.  Apparently they do not.  There is 
no reason to think it is part of the background knowledge of Aliens that all or most 
sensations other than pain are immaterial.  And Aliens are so different from humans 
that they hold—rightly—that everything they know through introspection about 
their own mental lives is irrelevant to the nature of human mental states. 
  
 My argument that the empirical supervenience claim favors materialism 
about pains over the relevant versions of dualism about pains has assumed the 
legitimacy of appealing to super-empirical criteria in assessing the comparative 
evidential merits of rival hypotheses.  And for some readers, despite my earlier 
remarks, this assumption will be unacceptable.  I ask them to reconsider.  Since the 
assumption raises fundamental issues about the justification of induction, I cannot 
 
14 See Melnyk (2003, Ch. 6) for some of this evidence. 
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adequately defend it here; but I should add two brief remarks.15  First, the appeal to 
super-empirical criteria to discriminate between empirically equivalent hypotheses 
is pervasive in both science and everyday life.  So we face a trilemma.  We must do 
one of the following: 
 
(i) accept the appeal as legitimate; 
(ii) candidly acknowledge that we aren’t really warranted in thinking that, 
for example, the universe is more than ten minutes old; or 
(iii) provide an alternative account of empirical evidence that vindicates our 
rejection of the ten-minute hypothesis but without appealing to super-
empirical criteria. 
 
I say that option (i) looks pretty good when compared to options (ii) and (iii); (ii) is 
preposterous, and no one knows how to do (iii). 
 
 Second, it is true that the appeal to, say, parsimony can be part of a reliable 
mode of inductive inference only if the world itself is parsimonious to some degree, 
i.e., correctly describable by theories that are parsimonious.  It is true too that there 
is no a priori deductive guarantee that the world is parsimonious, and that any 
attempted inductive proof that it is would be circular.  But so what?  The points I 
have just conceded precisely mimic Hume’s argument for skepticism about 
enumerative induction; the role played here by the parsimony of the world is played 
 
15 For a fuller defense, see Melnyk (2003, 244-251). 
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in Hume’s argument by the resemblance of the future to the past.  But although 
philosophers disagree as to where precisely Hume’s argument for skepticism about 
enumerative induction goes wrong, they nearly all agree that it must go wrong 
somewhere, and they do not recommend the abandonment of enumerative 
induction.16  I suggest that by parity of reasoning we should take exactly the same 
attitude as this toward skepticism about appeals to parsimony.  Skeptics about 
appeals to parsimony almost invariably assume that such appeals are problematic in 
a way in which enumerative induction is not; but I see no basis for that assumption. 
 
 My conclusion thus far, then, is that, for Aliens, the empirical supervenience 
claim favors materialism about pains over dualism about pains.  Let us now ask 
whether science has discovered anything about pains that points the other way, i.e., 
that favors dualism over materialism.  The answer is that it has not.  There are two 
kinds of evidence that, if discovered, would favor dualism over materialism, but 
neither kind—to the best of my knowledge—has actually been discovered.  First, the 
discovery of changes over time in pains, or variations among pains at a time, that do 
not correspond to simultaneous changes in, or variations among, neural states 
would be irresistible evidence for dualism; but, as we noted in section III, no such 
changes or variations have been discovered.  Second, a pain that is, or is realized by, 
a neural state must owe all its causal powers to that neural state.  So there would be 
irresistible evidence for dualism if some of the known behavioral or neural effects of 
pains were found to be such that the neural states that were the best candidates for 
 
16 I endorse James Van Cleve’s line on Hume’s inductive skepticism (Van Cleve 1984). 
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being identical with, or for realizing, pains were incapable in principle of causing the 
effects.  The discovery of such effects would show that the physical was not causally 
closed, i.e., that there were physical effects for which there did not exist a sufficient 
physical cause.  But I am unaware of any claims that such effects of pain have been 




 The conclusion of sections III and IV is that, for Aliens, what science has 
discovered about pain favors materialism over dualism about pains.  And this entails 
that, for us, what science has discovered about pain favors materialism over dualism 
about pains.  For we are neither inferior nor superior to Aliens in our ability to 
appreciate the evidential force of what science has discovered about pain.  It may be 
true that introspection can provide us humans (but not Aliens) with reason to think 
that pains are immaterial; I take no stand on the matter here.  But even if it is true, 
and introspective considerations favor dualism over materialism, it does not 
contradict the claim that what science has discovered about pain favors materialism 
over dualism.  Indeed, there is no contradiction even if introspective considerations 
favor dualism over materialism so strongly that, all things considered, we ought to 




 It might be objected that, if introspective considerations could favor dualism 
over materialism in the sense of raising the probability of dualism about pains to 
one, then a scientific discovery could not lower dualism’s probability at all, and so 
presumably could not favor materialism over dualism.17  I reply that introspection 
could never generate such considerations, since any case for dualism based directly 
or indirectly on introspection, even if it raised the probability of dualism very high, 
could never raise it to one; in the real world of non-ideal reasoners, there is always 
the possibility that any such case might be defective in some hitherto unrecognized 
way.  Proper defense of this fallibilist view would take us deep into epistemology, so 
I will say no more.  But if it is correct, then the conclusion of sections III and IV does 
indeed entail that, for us, what science has discovered about pain favors materialism 
over dualism about pains. 
 
 The conclusion of this paper is modest in a second way too.  As we saw in 
section II, there are, at the highest level of abstraction, just two ways in which pain 
could turn out to be purely material: it could turn out to be a certain kind of complex 
neural state or it could turn out to be a certain kind of neurally-realized higher-
order state.  But the conclusion of this paper is neutral between the two options; 
arguing for it has not required choosing between them.  This is noteworthy, because, 
though choosing between them has traditionally been a major issue in the 
philosophy of mind, we may well be unable to do so on the basis of empirical 
 
17 If the probability of dualism on introspective considerations is one, then the new prior 
probability of dualism, formed by conditionalization on this posterior probability, is also one; 
and, according to the Bayesian account of evidence, no evidence can lower the probability of a 
hypothesis whose prior probability is one. 
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evidence.  Crucial evidence for the second option over the first would be the 
discovery that pain is multiply realized.  But if pain is uniformly (i.e., non-multiply) 
realized in humans, which seems plausible, evidence of multiple realization would 
have to come from non-human animals: it would have to be evidence that certain 
animals (i) are in pain, but (ii) are not in any (human-type) neural state plausibly 
identifiable with pain.  But what evidence could show that they are in pain?  They 
obviously cannot tell us, and any behavior analogous to human pain-behavior might 
well be deemed inconclusive.  That they were in a (human-type) neural state 
plausibly identifiable with pain would certainly be evidence that they are in pain, 
but would defeat the attempt to demonstrate multiple realization.  That they were in 
a higher-order state plausibly identifiable with pain would also be evidence that they 
are in pain, but the plausibility of the identification would be challenged as question-
begging by the advocates of the neural-state identity theory. 
 
 The conclusion of this paper is modest, finally, in that it carries no 
commitment to any particular specification, for each state of pain, of which neural 
state, or neurally-realized higher-order state, that state of pain is.  One might have 
assumed the opposite, i.e., that, by the reasoning described in section IV, features of 
pain are (or are realized by) the neural states which correspond to them, e.g., that 
pain intensity = activity in such-and-such regions of S1, S2, anterior cingulate cortex, 
and insular cortex.  But this assumption would be incorrect.  Suppose that a certain 
sort of change over time in pains corresponds to a certain sort of simultaneous 
neural change over time.  To account for this correspondence by hypothesizing that 
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pains are purely material states entails that the changing feature of pain in question 
is, or is realized by, some neural state that overlaps the simultaneous neural state; 
but no stronger claim is entailed. 
 
 It is noteworthy that one can provide evidence that pains are purely material 
without being committed to specific hypotheses as to which kinds of pain or 
features of pain are (or are realized by) which neural states.18  At least one other 
argument that pains are purely material does not have this feature.  If the Hill-
McLaughlin argument were applied to the particular case of pain, it would draw an 
inference to the best explanation from the fact that people are in pain when, and 
only when, they are in so-and-so neural state.  The conclusion inferred would be the 
specific hypothesis that pain = so-and-so neural state. 
 
 It is a good thing, at least for materialists, that one can provide evidence that 
pains are purely material without being committed to specific hypotheses as to 
which kinds of pain or features of pain are (or are realized by) which neural states.  
For even if we knew necessary and sufficient neural conditions for every aspect of 
our state of mind when in pain, and even if we accepted that pains are purely 
material, it would still not be clear which neural states to treat as identical with (or 
as realizing) pain.  The reason is that, when we are in pain, we are typically in a 
variety of distinguishable mental states, and it’s not clear which of these mental 
states are parts, and which just concomitants, of being in pain.  For example, when 
 
18 If I understand them correctly, a similar claim is made (on different grounds) by 
Thomas Polger and Kenneth Sufka (Polger and Sufka 2005, 344). 
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experiencing the pain caused by a sharp object’s penetrating the skin, is the 
pressure one may feel at the point of contact a part of the pain?  What about the 
sudden anxiety that one might feel?  There is no reason to think—and every reason 
to doubt—that either the everyday term “pain” or the ordinary concept of pain is 
precise enough to yield definite answers to all questions of this sort.  But there is no 
threat to the thesis that pains are purely material so long as the thesis turns out to 
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